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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on reporting of Internet malicious activity (or
mal-activity in short) by public blacklists with the objective of pro-
viding a systematic characterization of what has been reported
over the years, and more importantly, the evolution of reported
activities. Using an initial seed of 22 blacklists, covering the period
from January 2007 to June 2017, we collect more than 51 million
mal-activity reports involving 662K unique IP addresses worldwide.
Leveraging the Wayback Machine, antivirus (AV) tool reports and
several additional public datasets (e.g., BGP Route Views and Inter-
net registries) we enrich the data with historical meta-information
including geo-locations (countries), autonomous system (AS) num-
bers and types of mal-activity. Furthermore, we use the initially
labelled dataset of ≈ 1.57 million mal-activities (obtained from pub-
lic blacklists) to train a machine learning classifier to classify the
remaining unlabeled dataset of ≈ 44 million mal-activities obtained
through additional sources. We make our unique collected dataset
(and scripts used) publicly available for further research.
The main contributions of the paper are a novel means of report
collection, with a machine learning approach to classify reported
activities, characterization of the dataset and, most importantly,
temporal analysis of mal-activity reporting behavior. Inspired by
P2P behavior modeling, our analysis shows that some classes of mal-
activities (e.g., phishing) and a small number of mal-activity sources
are persistent, suggesting that either blacklist-based prevention
systems are ineffective or have unreasonably long update periods.
Our analysis also indicates that resources can be better utilized by
focusing on heavy mal-activity contributors, which constitute the
bulk of mal-activities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Public reports of malicious online activity are commonly used in
the form of blacklists by intrusion detection systems, spam filters
and alike to determine if a host is known for suspicious activity.
However very little is known about the dynamics of the reporting
of malicious activities. Understanding what has been reported and
how the reported activity evolves over time can be of paramount
importance to help assess the efficacy of blacklist-based threat pre-
vention systems. We conduct a longitudinal measurement study of
reporting of malicious online activities (abridged to mal-activities),
over a ten-year period (from January 2007 to June 2017). We define
a mal-activity as any activity reported by one or more public data
sources (in particular, within blacklists). The actor or entity behind
each mal-activity can be reduced to a combination of IP address,
autonomous system (AS) in which the reported IP address resides
or the country in which the IP address is located, which we call
malicious hosts.1 We collect 51.6M mal-activity reports involving
662K unique IP addresses worldwide. We use the Internet Way-
back Machine [13], reports from antivirus (AV) tools, and several
additional datasets to obtain historical meta-information about the
data such as geo-location (countries) and AS numbers. We cate-
gorize the combined mal-activities from different sources into six
classes: Malware, Phishing, Fraudulent Services (FS), Spamming, Ex-
ploits, and Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs). The collected
dataset encompasses attributes and historical knowledge of numer-
ous malicious hosts from these six classes, providing a wide range
of possible mal-activities. To foster further research, we release the
dataset and scripts used in this paper to the research community:
https://internetmaliciousactivity.github.io/
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We use a machine learning approach to label the entire
dataset (51.6M mal-activities) by training a classifier on
1.57M labelled reports (obtained from public blacklists). More
specifically, we train an ensemble of Random Forest classi-
fiers on basic report information, such as the IP, day, month
1We acknowledge that hosts may be infected or victimized to perform mal-activities
instead of intentional involvement. This paper does not differentiate between them.
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year, autonomous system number, country code, and organi-
zation names to correctly label the type of mal-activity that
may have been committed. Over a training/testing split of
40%/60% on the dataset that contained labels from the source,
we are able to achieve an accuracy of 93.5% in re-identifying
the type of mal-activity committed. The trained model is
then leveraged to predict the mal-activity type of reports
that were deficient in this information.
• Wedetermine thatmal-activities of theMalware class have IP
addresses that are hosted in diverse set of hosting infrastruc-
tures as well as geo-locations. We observe that on average
the Malware class, at 88%, is 54% more prevalent in hosting
infrastructures, and 29% more prevalent in geo-locations
(countries) than any other other classes of mal-activities. By
comparison, our analysis reveals that the reports of PUP and
Spammer classes of mal-activity are more concentrated with
2,200 and 561 unique ASes, respectively (§ 2.5).
• We observe that the hosting infrastructure of mal-activities
are primarily concentrated in US and China. A normalized
view of a country’s IP space revealed the British Virgin Is-
lands and Anguilla, with large proportions of malicious IPs;
However deeper investigation revealed a country’s IP space
can be dominated by singular ASes, cautioning the use of a
country’s proportion of malicious IP addresses within the IP
space (§ 3.2).
• We analyze the volume of reported mal-activity over time
(§ 4.1). We observe that while malware has historically been,
and continues to be, the dominant class, starting from 2012,
reports of phishing activities have steadily risen, recently be-
coming the second largest class in volume (29% as compared
to 59% reports of malware in the year 2017).
• We study the periods of “activity” and “inactivity” of hosts (at
the IP, AS and country-level) as proxied by their presence or
absence from the reports modeled by an alternating renewal
process to capture the churn rates of the reports. We con-
sider lifetime (resp. deathtime) distributions for active (resp.
inactive) periods. A high average lifetime reflects reporting
of persistent threats, while a low average deathtime would
indicate resiliency to reporting (§ ??). Based on this, we ana-
lyze the behavior of the different classes of mal-activity and
note that phishing activities are the most resilient with the
lowest average deathtimes indicating quick recovery from
potential shutdowns (§ ??).
• We analyze mal-activity recurrence as the rate at which a
particular mal-activity re-emerges in the reports and observe
that countries such as Colombia, Panama, Bahamas, Norway
and Mexico have the highest rates, owing perhaps to weak
cyber defense infrastructure, or relaxed regulations (§ ??).
• We measure the magnitude of reported mal-activities as the
average volume of occurrences during active periods. Our
results show that while 86% of the IP addresses and 27%
of the ASes are being reported to be involved in a unique
mal-activity per week when they are active, a mere 200 IP
addresses are reported in a massive 10K+ malicious reported
activities per week (§ 4.2).
Our results reveal some surprising observations which indicate
that blacklists-based online prevention systems are either powerless
against some persistent threats originating from a small number of
sources, or at best suffer from quite unreasonable updating periods
(§ ??). Our findings also suggest that phishing is a highly resilient
activity that very likely will not be defeated by blacklists-based
approaches only (§ ??). Finally, we believe that tracking heavy
mal-activity contributors should be a priority for law enforcement
agencies, major network providers and cloud operators as they
clearly constitute the largest chunk of malicious activities threat
vector (§ 4.2). Adopting approaches to detect the emergence of such
heavy mal-activity contributors at an early stage is arguably key to
significantly reducing their impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
summarize our dataset along with our methodology to augment
and annotate the initial dataset. Section 4 presents our analysis
of the behavior of the reporting of malicious activity. We discuss
related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 DATA COLLECTION
We initially identified a sizable set of publicly-available blacklist
sources (22, from static URLs), which are augmented in two iterative
ways: First, we looked up the historical versions of these blacklists
by using the Internet Wayback Machine. The blacklists and their
historical versions (ranging from January 2007 to June 2017) give
us a set of IP addresses and malicious domains that have been
involved in some malicious activity within that time frame along
with the corresponding timestamp and activity tag. We call this list
Blacklist-07-17.
As a second step, we submit all IP addresses present in Blacklist-
07-17 to an AV tool aggregator service, VirusTotal (VT) [30]. We
query VT for all additional reports (again covering the period 2007-
2017) it has on those IP addresses and malicious domains that
we collected from the blacklists. In addition, from VT reports, we
extract the list of malicious files associated with the malicious activ-
ities. Some of these files are software binary executables containing
hard-coded IP addresses, often called referrers.2 We collected all
referrers that correspond to IP addresses in Blacklist-07-17 as well
as all other associated IP addresses and reports found to be carried
out by these referrers.
The total reports generated by VT via additional queries, refer-
rers’ IP extraction and Blacklist-07-17 constitute our set of malicious
activities, which we call VTBlacklist. Figure 1a summarizes our data
collection process. We further augment VTBlacklist with historical
metadata consisting of the relevant Autonomous System (AS) and
corresponding listed country in which the IP address resided at
the time of reporting. The resulting augmented data is called the
FinalBlacklist. The metadata augmentation process is displayed in
Figure 1b.
Next, we describe the above mentioned data collection method-
ology in more detail. A more extensive description and detailed
statistics are described in:
https://internetmaliciousactivity.github.io/
2For instance, Zeus – a Trojan toolkit used for credit card fraud and stealing users’
banking details – has a set of hard coded IP addresses, presumably C&C servers.
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(a) Seed Blacklist and VirusTotal Data Collection (b) Meta-Data
Figure 1: Dataset Collection and Augmentation
2.1 The Seed Dataset: Blacklist-07-17
The collection of this seed dataset was initiated by (manually) identi-
fying a set of publicly available blacklists commonly used as sources
that report a wide range of mal-activities. Data sources that do not
contain timestamps, require a subscription (reporting as a service),
or that have a robot.txt policy, restricting automated access (i.e.,
crawlers), have been discarded. Historical versions of these black-
lists available through the use of the Internet Wayback Machine
were obtained, spanning the period from January 2007 to June 2017,
consisting of over 2million “timestamped” reports of 297,095 unique
IP addresses. There are data discrepancies between the blacklists,
but they minimally contain the timestamp, IP address, and type of
mal-activity in each report. The exact differences and basic statistics
of Blacklist-07-17 are summarized in Appendix A.1 and Table 5.
Blacklist-07-17 is used here as an initial seed for more extensive
monitoring of malicious activity reports (see next section VTBlack-
list). The extension seeks to address problems of dynamic report
generation (not captured by Internet Wayback Machine), niche
threat biases, and archive periodicity of the seed blacklists. These
limitations are detailed in Section 2.6.
2.2 The Reported Activities Dataset:
VTBlacklist
VirusTotal (VT) is the largest publicly available aggregator of an-
tivirus (AV) products providing scan results from 67 different AV
products (as of January 21, 2019). We use the report API [30] to
query VT for domains and IP addresses. This returned the associ-
ated aggregated reports from different AV products. As malicious
domains are likely to change their hosting infrastructure over time
or to be simultaneously associated with several hosting infrastruc-
tures [36][35], we queried VT to receive all reports associated with
every malicious domain in Blacklist-07-17. The returned reports
include current and past IP addresses belonging to the domain
with timestamps. Through this process, we identified additional
IP addresses. Similarly, an IP address may host several domains
involved in mal-activities [35]. We queried VT with each IP address
in Blacklist-07-17 as input to obtain a list of (timestamped) reports
on malicious domains that are (or were) hosted on the given IP
address.
While it is possible to re-query VT using the obtained list of
IP addresses and domains to extract further reports in a recursive
manner, we did not do so due to rate limits imposed on the API
calls and the sheer size of obtained reports. Since we queried VT
for every reported activity confirmed by AV products about the
list of IP addresses, the generation of additional historical reports
compensates for the sparsity in time coverage of Blacklist-07-17
(see Appendix 2.6). In total, we gathered a list of 662,289 unique IP
addresses corresponding to 51,645,995 reported malicious activities
collectively called VTBlacklist. Now, we describe how we enriched
the reported mal-activity datasets with historical metadata.
2.3 The Augmented Dataset: FinalBlacklist
We enrich our data to extend the list of attributes in the dataset
by linking additional attributes (metadata) including AS numbers
(ASNs) and geolocation information. The key is to extract relevant
historical metadata, consistent with the timestamp of the report.
AS Mapping. To map IP addresses to the corresponding ASes with
historical accuracy, we used the BGP Route Views dataset [23].
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This dataset consists of daily snapshots of the BGP routing table
collected between 2007 and 2017.
Country Mapping. We further use MaxMind GeoCity [10] and Pota-
roo [21] datasets to map an IP address to its respective country (i.e.,
territories under sovereign rule or autonomous entities, e.g. BV.)
and country code, and used the Wayback Machine to obtain their
archived versions for historical mappings. Since these archived ver-
sions have “gaps,” we consider the closest available IP-geolocation
mapping to the reported mal-activity timestamp. This approxima-
tion is further discussed in Section 2.6.
2.4 Classification of Mal-Activities
Our augmented FinalBlacklist is composed of a myriad of mal-
activities with 15% (7.6M) originally labeled by their respective
data sources, and the remaining 85% (44M) unlabeled. To classify
all mal-activities, we employ manual classification of the labeled
mal-activities, and leverage machine learning to extend the known
labels onto the unlabeled dataset. We detail these approaches in the
following sections.
2.4.1 Manual Classification of Labeled Dataset. Each labeled mal-
activity in our dataset is classified into one of 4,918 unique mal-
activity labels by their respective data sources. Careful analysis of
these labels shows that the disparity between labels can be reduced
by only considering the end-goal or motivation of the adversary.
Based on this observation, each author re-classified each activity
into one of only six classes of labels. The co-authors disagreed on
1.07% of the cases, which was resolved using majority voting. If
consensus was not reached, the activity was marked as unlabeled
and discarded from the labeled dataset. The classes of reported mal-
activities are Exploits, Malware, Fraudulent Services (FS), Spammers,
Phishing, and Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP). We define these
mal-activities in Appendix B.
2.4.2 Classifying Unlabeled Dataset. Classification of a large num-
ber (44M, 85%) of unlabeled mal-activities is a non-trivial task. One
way is to leverage the VirusTotal request API to retrieve labels.
However, due to rate limits imposed by VirusTotal, classifying this
volume of mal-activities would require an unreasonable amount of
time. Therefore, we decided to use our labeled dataset (7.6M, 15%)
to determine if there is sufficient information available that can be
used to predict class labels to the unlabeled mal-activities.
Motivation. To motivate the plausibility of this approach, we
highlight one aspect of the labelled dataset called “specialization.”
More precisely, we found that a large proportion of hosts partic-
ipate in single class of mal-activity, i.e., specialize in one class
of activity, indicating that past involvement in a particular mal-
activity class is a good indicator of a future class label. To demon-
strate this, for a given host h (IP address) in the labeled dataset,
we first compute: p(h,a) = # of reports for host h with activity aTotal # of reports for host h , where
a is one of the six mal-activity classes. We then define a probabilis-
tic metric, host specialization, which is based on the distribution
of mal-activities by hosts in the labeled dataset. Formally, it is
defined as the normalized Shannon entropy per host h given by
S(h) = (−∑a p(h,a) log2 p(h,a))/log2 k , where k ≤ 6 is the num-
ber of activities done by host h and a ranges over the 6 classes of
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Specialization
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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Figure 2: IPs, ASes, andCountries Specialization inBlacklist-
07-17 dataset. Most IP addresses specialize in a single class
of mal-activity.
activities. A host highly specializes in a single class of mal-activity
if it has a lower value of S(h). From Figure 2, we observe that 80%
of the reported IP addresses exclusively participate in one class of
mal-activity. When we expand the definition of a host to include
an AS or a country, we observe a more uniform distribution across
the hosts, with 55% of ASes and only 20% of countries (CC) partici-
pating in one class of mal-activity. Furthermore, only 0.04% (311)
of IP addresses, 2.12% (275) of ASes, and 27.4% (54) of countries,
participate in all six classes. On closer look, we found that 96.8% of
IP addresses, 87.7% of ASes and 74.4% of countries have a relative
entropy value of less than 0.50. This suggests that a substantial
number of hosts (IPs, ASes, and Countries) will be biased towards
one class of mal-activities.
Following this intuition, we suspect there is sufficient informa-
tion within the mal-activity reports for the training of a classifier
to predict the report’s mal-activity label. Specifically, if this trained
classifier has good testing accuracy on our labelled dataset, we
can leverage the classifier to predict the mal-activity label of our
unlabelled reports.
Machine Learning Approach to Label Mal-Activities. As each re-
port can be labelled one of the 6 mal-activity labels (§2.4), we es-
tablish the task of predicting the mal-activity label as a multi-class
classification problem. We leverage a Random Forest classifier, with
our original labelled dataset divided into training (40%) and testing
(60%) sets. The labelled Blacklist-07-17 dataset contains 1,006,171
samples of malware, 164,149 of phishing, 60,146 of exploit, 297,652
of fraudulent services, 43,582 of unwanted programs, and 2,691
samples of spammers. The split of the dataset (into training and
testing sets) is stratified, with a consistent proportion of training
and testing samples for each mal-activity label. The large number
of reports in the labelled dataset prevented us from using more
reports in the training dataset, as the random forest implementa-
tion from scikit-learn [51] would encounter memory issues, despite
more than 96 GB of RAM provisioned for the task. As the training
set is dwarfed by the testing set, we repeated the model training
and testing process 5 times, each on different training/testing splits
of the data. This repetition ensures our results are not a result of a
biased split in the data.
Table 1 lists the features used for labelling mal-activities. We
note that One-Hot encoding is a common approach of encoding
categorical features, whereby the encoding maps a categorical fea-
ture with k categories into k binary vectors. An alternate method
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is to encode the categorical data as numerals, however, this would
also produce a misleading numerical relationship between the cat-
egories depending on their order. We have chosen the features of
day, month, year, and IP address (decomposed into octets) as this is
the most basic information available in a mal-activity report. On
the other hand, AS, country and organization information can be
easily found from the given IP address via a whois lookup.
We decompose the IP address into its octets to allow the model
to learn possible \8, \16, \24, \32 relationships, that would otherwise
not be possible with a full 32-bit IP encoding. It is also acknowl-
edged that IPs are dynamic in nature, and it has been observed that
malicious domains hosting malware are transferred to other IPs
within an IP block under a single controlling entity (e.g., hosting
provider such as Amazon) [47]. Therefore in the interest of produc-
ing a sufficiently generalized model to handle possible IP changes,
we use octets.
Feature Data Type
Day integer
Month integer
Year integer
IP bits (0-7) integer
IP bits (8-15) integer
IP bits (16-23) integer
IP bits (24-31) integer
AS integer
Country One-Hot encoding
Organization One-Hot encoding
Table 1: Features used in Classification Task
Performance and Prediction of Unlabelled Data. On 6 Cores of an
Intel Xeon E5-2660 V3 clocked at 2.6 GHz and 96GB of memory, the
whole classification process took approximately 15 minutes. This
includes loading/splitting the data, training, testing and writing
results to disk. As we have trained 5 models on different splits of
the original training data, rather than discarding 4 models to only
use one, we construct an ensemble of all 5 models (a classifier en-
semble). Each of the 5 models provides a prediction, consisting of a
label and associated probability (confidence). From this, the label
with the highest average probability is assigned to the mal-activity
report. This method of majority voting is known as soft-voting. The
class-specific accuracies of Malware, Phishing, Exploits, Fraudulent
Services, PUP, Spammers, averaged over all 5 models is 93.04%,
93.85%, 79.04%, 91.70%, 96.29%, 82.57%, respectively. Since the num-
ber of samples for each label is uneven, we therefore performed a
weighted average over the label-specific accuracies to produce an
overall accuracy, which turned out to be 92.49%.
2.5 Summary of the Augmented Dataset
In Table 2, we report the total number of mal-activities correspond-
ing to the six classes, along with the collected metadata. Overall,
we collected a total of 51,645,995 mal-activity reports from all data
sources (cf. Table 5 in Appendix A.1). With manual labeling and the
use of our random forest machine learning classifier, we categorized
44,003,768 (85%) unlabelled reports into six different classes. The
result produces malware as the largest mal-activity class (90.9%),
and spammers as the smallest (0.01%).
Given that 136,941 (20.7%) of IP addresses in the reports are being
reported to be involved in more than one class of mal-activities,
the percentage breakdown under each metadata attribute such
as IP address, ASes or geolocation (country) does not add up to
100%. We found that the labelled IPs (662,409) host 8.42M, 8.79M,
and 948K number of unique domains, URLs, and malicious files
(i.e., executables), respectively. We also find that IP addresses that
correspond to mal-activities are referenced in 18K malicious files
(i.e., referrers).
Note that, as an IP-endpoint (such as a Web server) could host
more than one domain and could have multiple resources (i.e.,
URLs), once again, the percentage of number of domains and URLs
does not add to 100%.
Table 2: Summary of the FinalBlacklist dataset. “U” denotes
unique and “FS” represents Fraudulent Services.
Class # Reports # U. IP # U. ASes # U. CC
Malware 46,932,466 (90.9%) 427,745 (65%) 11,435 (88%) 196 (99%)
Phishing 2,450,247 (4.74%) 133,072 (20%) 4,402 (34%) 139 (70%)
FS 1,141,377 (2.21%) 87,508 (13%) 3,264 (25%) 118 (60%)
PUP 895,494 (1.73%) 165,465 (25%) 2,200 (17%) 81 (41%)
Exploits 218,791 (0.42%) 39,854 (6%) 2,966 (23%) 112 (57%)
Spammers 7,620 (0.01%) 2,209 (0.3%) 561 (4%) 60 (30%)
Total 51,645,995 (100%) 662,409 (100%) 12,950 (100%) 198 (100%)
2.6 Limitations
Despite our best efforts to collect the most comprehensive set of
data sources to perform our study, there are still some limitations
worth mentioning.
First, a limitation Blacklist-07-17 is that we did not use some
popular blacklists that we are aware of (e.g., the Spamhaus Project
[26] and PhishTank [20]), as the lists in those reporting services
were dynamically generated and hence it is very difficult to extract
their historical versions (the Way Back machine does not archive
dynamically generated content). Second, Blacklist-07-17 might be
biased towards specific or niche threats, e.g., specific focus of the
Zeus, Spyeye or OpenPhish blacklists (cf. Table 5). Also, Wayback
Machine snapshots are sporadic and as a result Blacklist-07-17 is
subject to sparsity in time coverage. This was one of the motiva-
tions to feed the initial lists to the VirusTotal service to extract more
comprehensive reports across the whole 2007-2017 period. Finally,
the IP-Country mappings described in Section 2.3, are obtained
from Wayback Machine archives of Maxmind and Potaroo. Here,
we could not recover the exact mapping due to the sporadic nature
ofWaybackMachine records (as we did for the historical versions of
blacklists using VT Score reporting). Instead, we consider the clos-
est available IP-geolocation mapping to the reported mal-activity
timestamp. We acknowledge that accuracy of IP address to location
databases may impact our analysis. However, note that database
accuracies are questioned at the city and region-levels, but previ-
ous research has shown that geolocation databases can effectively
locate IP addresses at the country-level [53].
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3 CHARACTERIZATION OF MAL-ACTIVITIES
In this section, we analyze whether a few hosts (IP addresses, coun-
tries and ASes) are more biased towards specific classes of mal-
activities or if the spread is more uniformly distributed. We also
provide further insights where a particular mal-activity is skewed
towards a few hosts.
3.1 Distribution of Mal-Activities
We first study the distribution of IPs over the categories of mal-
activities, then analyze the geolocation distribution at both country
and AS levels.
3.1.1 Across IP Addresses. The majority of IP addresses (63.0%) are
repeat offenders with participation in mal-activities reported more
than once as shown in Figure 3a. Among the different classes of
mal-activities, IP addresses corresponding to Fraudulent Services
(81.6%) and Malware (65.0%) were the most involved in more than
one corresponding mal-activity. Spammers on the other hand are
the least repeated by an IP address (only 36.4%). Overall, about
18.0% of all IP addresses were involved in at least 10 reports of
mal-activity, with an average of 78.0 reports per IP.
Insights. We observe that 54.72.9.51 is the most reported IP
address, managed by AS16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc.)
in the US, which is dominated by the malware class with 43,753
reports. This is consistent with reports [41][44] on cybercrimi-
nals using, often, free Amazon Web Services (AWS) to host a large
volume of SpyEye Trojans and exploit kits for mal-activities. Simi-
larly, we found that 69.172.216.56 is the third most reported IP
address, managed by AS7415 (Integral Ad Science–aWeb ad and an-
alytic service) in Canada, primarily due to suspicious ad campaigns
comprising of 35,885 unique PUPs. We were unable to determine
whether this IP address is infected with malware. However, our
study confirms previous findings [48][47] on cybercriminals us-
ing leading ad networks to propagate mal-activities (in this case,
Integral Ad Science). Previous research [55] showed that spam-
mers often quarantine bots for a period, waiting for them to be
whitelisted again.
3.1.2 Across Countries. Our dataset shows that there is at least
one malicious IP address hosted in almost every country (avg. 4170
IP addresses per country). However, Figure 3b indicates that the
mal-activities are not evenly distributed among countries. The fig-
ure shows that mal-activities are a prevalent cybersecurity threat
worldwide with 20.2% of countries having more than 10K mali-
cious reports, although the distribution varies from one class of
mal-activity to another. Malware is distributed relatively evenly
whilst spammers are concentrated in a few selected countries like
United States, Russia, British Virgin Islands, Ukraine, and Germany
with proportions of the spamming activity at 35%, 22%, 9%, 5%, and
5%, respectively.
Insights. Our results agree with the expectation that countries
with rich IT infrastructure such as US, Germany, China, France,
and the Netherlands are dominant in terms of mal-activities (42M,
1.47M, 1.32M, 1.24M and 0.41M, respectively). Interestingly, British
Virgin Islands (VG) is ranked 8th with 243K mal-activities. Out of
these 80.1% are malware, trailed by FS with 9.6%.
3.1.3 Across ASes. Figure 3c shows the distribution of mal-
activities per AS. Majority (82.4%) of the ASes are involved in
more than one mal-activity, with 59.2% of all labelled ASes con-
tributing to at least 5 mal-activities. Among the different classes of
mal-activities, Malware is seen in the highest proportion of ASes,
specifically in 88.3% of all reported ASes. In contrast, spammers are
distributed over the smallest proportion of ASes, only 4.33%.
Insights. We note that AS16509 (managed by AMAZON-02 and
located in US) is the most aggressive with 25.8M of all mal-activities
(52.0% of all labeled mal-activities in our dataset). We also observe
that it has contributed to all classes of mal-activities, predominantly
malware (24.5M) and phishing (463K). This indicates that cloud
service providers are often preferred by cybercriminals to inflict
harm on online services at scale.
3.2 Normalized Geo-Density and Diversity
To minimize the bias of massive Internet services infrastructures in
countries such as the US, we investigate the normalized distribution
of mal-activities. To this end, we use the CIPB [4] and AS-Rank [3]
datasets to garner the total number of allocated IP addresses per
country and per AS, respectively, and measure the ratio of the
number of malicious IP addresses to the total allocated IP addresses
of a given country or AS.
3.2.1 Across Countries. Figure 4a depicts the CDFs of the number
of mal-activities per country. Overall, the ratio of malicious IP
addresses to the total number of addresses is low, however, the
long-tail of the distributions (the top right) reveal a few countries
with relatively high proportion of IP addresses participating in mal-
activities. In Table 3(a), we list the top 5 countries that correspond to
the tail of the distributions in Figure 4a. The table shows that British
Virgin Islands (VG) has the highest proportion of IP addresses
followed by Anguilla, Lithuania, Belize, and Luxembourg.
Insights. The biggest proponent of mal-activities within the
British Virgin Islands is AS40034 (with 205K reports), under the
control of Confluence-Networks which is a large hosting service
provider. The next biggest contributing AS is AS44571, netVillage,
a social networking platform provider, which has 2.4K reports. An-
guilla’s high proportion of mal-activities are predominantly the
result of HostiServer, controlling AS32338, another content AS.
This shows that only a few ASes might drive up the normalized
distribution of mal-activities in countries with smaller Internet
infrastructures.
3.2.2 Across Ases. Similarly, we plot the normalized distribution of
malicious IP addresses per AS in Figure 4b, which shows a similar
trend to country level analysis, despite all distributions appearing
to stretch to both lower and higher percentages. This suggests that
there are ASes that do not host or rarely host malicious IP addresses,
in addition to ASes in which a large ratio of their allocated IP space
has been observed to partake in mal-activities. Table 3(b) lists the
top 5 ASes with the highest ratio. We observe that AS31624, located
in the Netherlands (NL) and belonging to VFMNL-AS, has 57.6% of
its IPs participating in 12.3K reports ofMal-Activities corresponding
to all six categories of mal-activity. AS44901 (BELCLOUD, Bulgaria)
is the second and AS54761 (SAMBREEL-SVCS, United States) is the
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Figure 3: Number of mal-Activities per IP, country and ASN.
third in the list with 44.5% and 33.7% respectively, participating in
mal-Activities.
Insights. AS31624 is a now defunct Trading and Service De-
posit Company. BELCLOUD’s AS44901 is a data center, which had
previously routed malicious requests, as detected by BGP Route
Views [23]. Sambreel, is a software services company which de-
veloped adware plugins that were later abused by advertisers [24],
contributing to a larger space of maliciously marked IP addresses.
A shared trait between these ASes is that they have comparatively
smaller IP space, with none of the three exceeding 5,000 allocated
IP addresses. The reader may argue that content ASes, in particular,
hosting services, are expected to have a large proportion of their
IP space constantly abused. However, we observe that in all the
registered content ASes, only 5% have more than 1% of their IP
Space marked as malicious. Note further that viewing the propor-
tions of IP space marked as malicious does not give the complete
picture, as the biggest offenders in terms of volume of mal-activities
is AS20940 (Akamai International B.V.), and AS14618 (Amazon.com,
Inc.), with a proportion of malicious IP space of only 0.49% and
1.36% respectively.
(a) Countries
Country Code (CC) Mal. IPs Total IPs Ratio Vol.
VG 1443 135,030 1.07% 207,125
AI 91 10,260 0.89% 222
LT 4928 2,690,680 0.18% 36,802
BZ 323 178,472 0.18% 1,895
LU 14 8,448 0.17% 26,273
(b)ASes
Mal. Tot. Total
AS Organization IPs IPs Ratio Vol.
31624 VFMNL-AS, NL 2,506 4,352 57.58% 12,253
44,901 BELCLOUD, BG 114 256 44.53% 1,153
54,761 SAMBREEL, US 431 1,280 33.67% 1,482
133,618 TRELLIAN-AS, AU 277 1,024 27.05% 36,442
49,087 PodCem-AS, UA 68 256 26.56% 720
Table 3: Top 5 (a) countries and (b) ASes, with the largest
ratio of allocated IP space reported for participating in mal-
activities.
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Figure 4: The ratio of the number of IPs per country (resp.
AS) involved in mal-Activities to total number of allocated
IPs per country (resp. AS).
3.3 Geographical Entropy of Mal-Activity
In this section, we aim to find if (classes) of mal-activities are evenly
spread across hosts (IP addresses, ASes and countries) or are they
concentrated around a particular hosting infrastructure. We do this
by assessing the “geographical entropy” of mal-activities with a
diversity (or homogeneity) metric named affinity based on Shannon
entropy.
Affinity. We define affinity as the normalized entropy per malicious
activity a as A(a) = (−∑h q(h,a) log2 q(h,a))/log2 l , where l is the
number of hosts hosting an activity a, and;
q(h,a) = # of reports from host h with activity aTotal # of reports for activity a .
HereA(a) = 1means that reports of themal-activitya are uniformly
distributed among all hosts and conversely, and A(a) = 0 implies
that all reports are concentrated on a single host.
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Insights. We observe that at the IP host level, mal-activities are
relatively evenly distributed with Spammers having the highest
affinity (0.820), closely followed by PUP (0.815) and Malware having
the least (0.691). However, if we look at the AS host level, we see that
some classes of mal-activities are concentrated around a few ASes.
Malware has the lowest affinity (0.260), followed by 0.342 (PUPs),
0.458 (Phishing), 0.556 (FS), 0.564 (exploits), and 0.689 (spammers).
Digging further, we observe that 80.8% of all mal-activities are
covered by 10 ASes. Likewise, 83.8% of Malware is carried out by 10
ASes, and just 10 ASes contribute 84.2% of PUPs. The high affinity
of PUPs over IP addresses and low affinity over ASes confirms the
observation in [56] that PUPs are more stable or hosted over bullet-
proof infrastructure.3 Thus the different IP addresses contributing
to the PUPs, belong to only a few ASes. One of the reasons for the
stability of PUPs is that they are generally in a grey area making
them semi-legitimate and hence making it difficult to detect them
or take them down.
At the country level, PUPs exhibit the lowest affinity (0.085) and
spammers the highest (0.551). We observe that US alone contributes
94.2% of the PUP activity in contrast to its contributions of 35.4%
to the spamming. The change in affinity of PUPs from IP addresses
to ASes and now to the country level can be explained by the fact
that most PUPs (and malware) often rely on pay-per-install (PPI)
services4 that in turn use cloud providers, often located in the
US, to distribute unwanted programs. This has previously been
noted for instance for Amazon [41, 44], Integral Ad Science, and
DoubleClick [48]. We argue that mal-activity detection techniques
that only vet malicious infrastructures would fail to detect and
prevent the distribution of such mal-activities.
4 TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
The next contribution of this paper is the temporal analysis of
mal-activity reporting behavior. We start by observing the volume
of each class of reported mal-activity in our dataset over time.
Obviously the seed dataset Blacklist-07-17 corresponds to blacklists
with different time ranges, and therefore might be biased towards
specific periods of time where a particular mal-activity class would
be more aggressively reported than others (cf. § 2.6). However our
use of VirusTotal across the whole 2007-2017 period is intended to
overcome this limitation as we believe the extensive number of AV
products and their reports would be providing a comprehensive
scan of the whole reporting period.
Note that we avoid drawing conclusions out of IPs reported
globally as these are subject to dynamic IP allocation issues (e.g.
via DHCP).
4.1 Evolution of Reporting of Mal-Activities
We analyze the daily volume of different classes of reported mal-
activities in our dataset over time in Figure 5a (note log scale of
y-axis). Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe that reported mal-
activities have been steadily increasing in volume over the last
decade, with an interesting spike around 2008-2009 driven by the
inception of high-profile FS and exploit kits. One of the earliest
kits was MPack [50], a very popular “user-friendly” exploit kit
3i.e., hosts that guarantee service even after being detected malicious.
4PPI services are also used for benign software.
introduced in 2006. Typically, MPack included a collection of PHP
scripts aiming at exploiting browsers’ security holes and commonly
used programs (e.g., QuickTime).
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Figure 5: Evolution and proportion of mal-activities in the
dataset.
Phishing has seen two distinct periods of reporting. First, during
2009 and then in 2013 with an increase in the total volume of reports
by two orders of magnitude. This is consistent with a report from
Kaspersky Lab in 2013 [9] which points to the growing popularity
of digital payment systems attracting unwanted attention from
cybercriminals translated into a dramatic increase in the number
of finance-related attacks. We present the relative volume of the
reported mal-activity classes over time in Figure 5b. We see that
malware continues to dominate the proportion of mal-activities.
However, phishing has recently undergone an increase in volume:
29% of all mal-activities in the year 2017. In comparison, malware
stands at 59% of all mal-activities for the same year.
Lessons Learned. Malware is consistently the dominant class over
the years. However, interestingly, starting from around 2016-2017,
phishing is emerging as one of the major classes of mal-activities,
currently consisting of half the volume of Malware. Notwithstand-
ing that data sources may not have immediately reported on novel
classes of mal-activities (lower volume of mal-activities, other than
malware, in earlier years), the relative volume serves as a reasonable
proxy of the evolution of mal-activities reporting behavior.
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Figure 6: ChurnModel. Ki,c is the total number of reports in
the cth period of activity of host i.
Previous research [55] showed that spammers often quarantine
bots for a period of time, waiting for them to be “whitelisted” again.
Motivated by this, we study the periods of presence of IP addresses,
ASes and Countries (all denoted as hosts for simplicity) in the public
reports.
The Host Churn Model. Consider a malicious ecosystem with n
participating hosts, where each host h is either alive (i.e., present
in the system) or dead (i.e., logged off/clean/not reported) at any
given time t . An active host can be reported one or multiple times
as being malicious (denotedm). This behavior can be modeled by
an alternating renewal process Zi (t) for each host h, similar to the
peers churn model in peer-to-peer networks (e.g. Yao et al., [60]):
Zi (t) = 1 if host i has received at least one report at time t , and
Zi (t) = 0 otherwise, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and t is in weeks. Our traces
are created by binning the reports into weeks per reported host
(recall that host refers to an IP, AS or CC).
The model is illustrated in Figure 6 where c stands for the cycle
number, and durations of host i’s ON (life) and OFF (death) periods
are given by variables Li,c > 0 and Di,c > 0, respectively. Unlike
the model in [60], we empirically evaluate (through our data) all
lifetime (i.e., {Li,c }∞c=1) and off-time (i.e., {Di,c }∞c=1) durations by
averaging over all cycles in our dataset. We denote the average
lifetime as Li and the average deathtime as Di .
A high average lifetimewould reflect a report of persistent threats
(or infection) generally referred to as bulletproof entities, since
their involvement in mal-activities is not interrupted for extended
durations (even after being reported). A low average deathtime
indicates resiliency of the reported host as the mal-activity quickly
recovers from a potential shutdown. The reciprocal of mean cycle
duration is representative of the rate of arrival of a particular host. It
indicates the frequency with which a host participates in, or leaves,
a class of mal-activity and is defined as: λi = 1Li+Di . Consider a
scenario where a malicious host is frequently joining and leaving a
group of reported botnets (i.e., in bursts), then both average lifetime
and average deathtime would be small, and hence λi would be
relatively large.
Figure 7 displays the CDFs of mean lifetime, mean deathtime
and reciprocal of mean duration per IP address, ASN and country in
the Blacklists. Figure 7a shows that 86.4% of the IPs are short-lived
offenders with an average duration of just a week. As mentioned
earlier, we refrain from drawing conclusions on the time-based
behavior observed at an IP level due to the very likely dynamic IP
allocation over time. At an AS-level we found that 56.5% of the ASes
are short-lived with an average of one week duration of presence
in the blacklists. This number is drastically reduced to 17.4% for
countries, many of which are small African nations, or island states.
The long tails observed in the CDF of mean lifetime in Figure 7a
indicate that there are only a few hosts with an extended lifetime.
We report the IP addresses, ASes, and countries with the highest
lifetimes in Table 4(a). We observe that US has the longest mean
lifetime of 511 weeks by a large margin (China is ranked second at
55.8 weeks), showing a much higher persistence of reported mal-
activity in the US than any other country. Brazil, Canada and the
UK are the next most persistent countries with the longest average
lifetime of 54.8, 37.8 and 37.7 weeks, respectively. At an AS-level,
the most persistent reported AS is “China Telecom Backbone” with
147.0 weeks.
Figure 7b and Table 4(b) suggest that while most IP addresses
have a mean deathtime longer than 100 weeks indicating a low
participation, the “long head” indicates that only a few IPs are
recurring participants. Again with a focus on the AS and country
level, we observed that most ASes and countries are repeat offenders
from the perspective of blacklist reporting. At the country level,
in terms of resiliency (low deathtime), US is ranked first with no
deathtime, followed by Germany (1.50) and British Virgin Islands
(1.60). For the rate of arrival, we calculate the reciprocal of mean
duration and rank the countries accordingly. Table 4(c) shows that
the top 5 countries in terms of arrival rates are Colombia, Panama,
Bahamas, Norway, and Mexico, and constitute the most recurrent
countries to be reported in mal-activity involvement.
We also analyze the churn with respect to mal-activity classes.
From Figure 8a, we can observe that exploits tend to have reports
with the lowest mean lifetime (one week), while the rest of the
mal-activity classes are similar to each other with a heavier concen-
tration at longer weekly durations. In terms of resiliency, phishing
has the lowest deathtime (highest resiliency) as shown in Figure
8b. Due to lower mean deathtime, phishing also has the highest
mean rate of arrival indicated in Figure 8c, implying highly frequent
on-off reporting cycles, i.e., reported (in)active behavior.
Lessons Learned. The analysis shows that a small number of hosts
exhibit high renewal of mal-activities, indicating their presence on
a blacklist has not deterred their activities. The most recurrent IP
has an average report activity cycle of 5.5 weeks. Had this host
been blocked by blacklists, it would have been removed from said
lists in less than 5.5 weeks from the first reports. Thus blacklists
can consider longer durations prior to delisting a malicious host.
Phishing has been observed with the highest resiliency to periods
of no reporting (on average 54 weeks less than all mal-activities
combined), again suggesting delisting or their ability to circumvent
blacklist-based blocking. A overwhelming majority (97.7%) of IP
reports cease activities in 2 weeks, with average cycles of 185 weeks,
the blacklist providermust tradeoff between potential false positives
of hosts which had only been momentarily infected, or curbing the
minority of recurrent hosts.
4.2 Magnitude of Reported Malicious Activities
We define a “severity” metric to quantify the magnitude of the
reported activity during active periods of malicious hosts in the
blacklists. Formally, severity is defined as the average number of
reports of mal-activities per active cycle as per Figure 6. For host i ,
let Ki,c denote the total number of reports within the cth period of
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Table 4: Churn Analysis: Top 5 IPs, ASes, and Countries (CC) of Lifetime, Deathtime, and Rate of Arrival.
(a) Average Lifetime - LT (Most Persistent)
IP LT ASN Organization LT CC LT
209.85.200.132 62 4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE, CN 147 US 511
74.125.201.132 52 4837 CHINA169-Backbone, CN 39 CN 56
209.85.234.132 48 9800 UNICOM, CN 38 BR 55
74.125.70.132 38 32613 IWEB-AS, CA 28 CA 38
74.125.202.132 37 28753 LEASEWEB-DE-FRA-10, DE 26 GB 38
(b) Average Deathtime - DT (Most Resilient)
IP DT ASN Organization DT CC DT
103.224.212.222 3.0 36351 SOFTLAYER, US 1.5769 US 0
69.172.201.153 3.1 26496 GO-DADDY, US 1.6087 DE 1.5
204.11.56.48 3.7 40034 CONFLUENCE-NET., US 1.6122 VG 1.6
213.186.33.19 3.9 13335 CloudFlare, Inc. VG 1.6780 FR 1.8
208.73.211.70 4.2 14618 AMAZON-AES, US 1.8298 NA 2.0
(c) Rate of Arrival - RoA (Most Frequently Active)
IP RoA ASN Organization RoA CC RoA
69.172.201.153 0.183 8001 NET-ACCESS-CORP, US 0.177 CO 0.156
103.224.212.222 0.176 9931 CAT-AP, TH 0.175 PA 0.148
208.73.211.70 0.164 46636 NATCOWEB, US 0.173 BS 0.142
213.186.33.19 0.150 13649 ASN-VINS, US 0.173 NO 0.138
213.186.33.2 0.146 31103 KEWWEB AG, DE 0.169 MX 0.138
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Figure 7: Churn Analysis: CDFs of IPs, ASes, and Countries (CC) of Lifetime, Deathtime, and Rate of Arrival.
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Figure 8: Churn Analysis: CDFs of Rate of Arrival (Reciprocal of mean duration), mean Lifetime, and mean Deathtime for
mal-activities.
activity5 and as before let Li,c denote the active period (in weeks).
Then severity of host i , is defined as the average of Ki,c/Li,c over
all cycles of the host i in the dataset. A high severity value indi-
cates that whenever a host is active (reported in the blacklists) it is
accompanied by a large volume of reported mal-activities.
5Care has been taken to remove duplicate reports, i.e., same (time, IP, URL) tuple, from
Blacklist-07-17. In any case, potential duplicates in the 2M reports from Blacklist-07-17
dwarf in comparison to the 49M unique reports obtained from VT.
We report the results of magnitude analysis in Figure 9. Observe
that 27.4% of ASes and 9.45% of countries have a severity value
equal to one indicating a unique malicious report per week. The
CDF in Figure 10b indicates that only a few hosts are participating
in a plethora of mal-activities with as little as 200 IP addresses
reported to be involved in more than 10K malicious activities per
week. Figure 10c shows the CDF of the mean severity values for
each of the mal-activity classes. We observe that fraudulent services
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Figure 9: Magnitude analysis of top 5 IPs, ASes, and Coun-
tries.
ASN Organization Mag. CC Mag.
7276 UNIVERSITY-OF-HOUSTON 2206 US 82558
6762 SEABONE-NET, IT 2153 CN 377
16509 AMAZON-02 1817 DE 212
35994 AKAMAI-AS 1707 FR 149
53684 FLASHPOINT-SC-AS 1607 UA 80
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are reported in the “low severity” range when compared to the rest
of the categories.
Table (a) of Figure 9 lists IP addresses, ASes, and countries with
high values of severity. US has the highest severity of 82,558 re-
ports per week. Distant second are countries like China, Germany,
France, and ukraine with severity values of 377, 212, 149, and 80,
respectively. This is likely due to the fact that the majority of host-
ing services and Internet users originate from the US. Interestingly
we observe AS7276 (UNIVERSITY-OF-HOUSTON) with 2206 mal-
activities per week as the AS with the highest severity. They were
reported to have participated in all categories of mal-activities ex-
cept Spammers, with 59785 reports in the dataset.
We can observe a large portion of the reported mal-activities
originate from potentially misusing cloud provider services (e.g.,
Amazon Cloud) as these providers are unlikely to be intentionally
propagating their own mal-activity. This inference is consistent
with observations made in previous work [56].
Lessons Learned. Our analysis shows that malware has been the
largest component of reports (90.9%), see Table 2, but when con-
sidering the severity of reports, Malware on average produces 30.8
reports per week, phishing has the next largest severity, with 9.3
reports per week, despite only consisting of 4.74% of our dataset.
On average, malware is approximately 3 times as severe as phishing,
despite there being 19 times more malware reports than there is
Phishing reports. It would be advisable for enforcement agencies
to focus on the primary attack vector that is malware, as disabling
a malware source would yield the largest reduction of reports per
week. Not to discount the impact of shutting down a phishing host,
it too receives a third of the reports as the most severe mal-activity.
5 RELATEDWORK
Anumber of studies have characterized andmeasuredmal-activities,
in addition to proposing detection and/or prevention techniques.
Researchers have also proposed general approaches that rely either
on fundamental characteristics of botnet traffic or by correlating
meta-datasets. For example, several works detect botnets-based
mal-activities by investigating their traffic [34] or typical behav-
ior [40, 49, 58, 62]. Others have investigatedmultiple datasets includ-
ing web resources from suspicious domains [42], host and network
information [54, 61], honeypots [52] or DNS traffic [59]. Kuhrer
et al. [45] analyze the performance of blacklists, with a forwards-
facing collection of data by archiving it for a duration of two years.
In this paper, we revisit the blacklists utilized by them and with
additional sources, collect a backwards-facing dataset, which is
collected post-factum, covering 10 years prior. Our analysis of the
resulting dataset diverges as we perform the retrospective charac-
terization and measurement of (different classes of) mal-activities.
Using regional Internet registry (RIR) dataset spanning over a
period of 12 years, Dhamdhere et al., [38] define two metrics (at-
tractiveness and repulsiveness) to describe the relationship among
ASes. Compared to our work, Dhamdhere et al., do not focus on
mal-activity reporting, instead focusing on the AS ecosystem as a
whole. Antonakakis et al. [33] study the behavior of Mirai Botnet
activity with a dataset collected in 2016 by industrial partners, to ob-
serve the resilience of Mirai botnet against reverse engineering and
takedowns. Unfortunately this dataset, owned by Symantec, is not
available for further research, and only focuses on a specific type of
mal-activity, whilst our analysis covers six different classes. Leita
et al., [46] propose “HARMUR” a system that leverages historical
archives of malicious URLs collected by Symantec to detect mal-
activities. In conjunction with publicly available blacklists, DNS
reports of malicious domains, and Symantec’s proprietary malware
scanning service to resolve false-positives, for the collection of
malicious URLs. Their proposal retains a large-scale analysis of
the collected dataset as future work, however there has been no
mention of this dataset to date. It should be noted that HARMUR
leverages the historical information for the purpose of classifying
newly observed URLs, and thus is considered forwards-facing.
By analyzing logs generated by dynamic analysis of malware
samples spanning over a period of 5 years, Lever et al. [47] inves-
tigate the evolution and behavior of the malware and PUP cate-
gories of mal-activities. In contrast, our study retrieves static data
sources that span over 10 years and consists of broader categories
of mal-activities in six classes, with an analysis of infrastructure,
geo-location and behavior over time.
6 CONCLUSION
Researchers and the industry alike find themselves in a continual
arms race to fight against major instances of malicious activity on
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the internet. Although longitudinal datasets like ours do exist, they
are mostly proprietary since industries are unable to share it due
to reasons of privacy and to maintain a competitive advantage. In
this paper, we addressed this gap, with a novel methodology that
combined imperfect historical records with machine learning to
produce a decade long mal-activity dataset. To assist the research
community, we have released our dataset into the public domain
for further research:
https://internetmaliciousactivity.github.io/
With our unique dataset, we reflected on the behavior of mal-
activity reporting over the last decade in order to gain insights into
the continuing presence of malicious activity. Our analysis, charac-
terized host behavior among other aspects, recurrent periods, and
severity of mal-activity reporting in a P2P inspired churn model.
Our analysis suggests that tracking the heavy mal-activity contrib-
utors should be an absolute priority for law-enforcement agencies
and major network providers and cloud operators. We found a con-
sistent minority of heavy offenders (i.e., IPs, ASes, and countries)
that contribute a majority of mal-activity reports, posing a severe
threat to the status-quo of our online ecosystem. We observed a
number of hosts with a short renewal cycle of “(in)activity”. Their
presence on a blacklist has not deterred their activities. Had the host
been effectively blocked by blacklists, the renewal of their activity
indicates the removal of the host from said blacklists suggesting a
need to consider longer durations prior to delisting a malicious host.
Detecting and quickly reacting to the emergence of such heavy
mal-activity contributors would arguably significantly reduce the
damage inflicted by them.
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Table 5: Basic Statistics of the initial seed Blacklist-07-17 dataset (cf. Section 2.1).
# Source # Reports Unique IPs Attributes Reports Focus Years
1 hpHosts [12] 801,763 124,644 Domain, IP, label Malicious Hosts 2007-17
2 malc0de [14] 682,869 36,044 URL, IP, label Malware/Exploits 2009-17
3 Dyre SSLBL [28] 347,853 1,146 IP, label Bots & Trojans 2014-17
4 QueryURL [29] 144,866 35,244 URL, IP, label Phishing URLs 2017-17
5 MDL [15] 90,657 26,484 URL/Domain, IP, label Malicious Hosts 2009-17
6 360Mirai [1] 69,674 62,960 IP, label Zeus Botnet 2016-16
7 ML [17] 20,531 5,632 URL/Domain, IP, label Malicious Hosts 2009-11
8 Zeus [32] 19,728 1,716 Domain, IP, label Zeus Bots 2010-17
9 h3x [11] 19,362 4,263 URL/Domain, IP, label Bots & Trojans 2016-17
10 OpenPhish [18] 18,952 5,328 URL/Domain, IP, label Phishing URLs 2017-17
11 DShield [7] 9,999 9,999 IP, label Phishing URLs 2014-17
12 CyberCrime [6] 9,996 5,993 URL/Domain, IP, label Bots & Trojans 2012-17
13 SSLBL [28] 9,974 2,738 IP, label Mal. SSL certs 2014-17
14 RT. [22] 9,635 5,239 Domain, IP, label Ransome Hosts 2012-17
15 Curzit [5] 6,794 6,794 IP, label DDoS nodes 2009-17
16 MBL [16] 3,982 2,009 Domain, IP, label SpyEye Bots 2013-17
17 Feodo [8] 1,910 1,168 Domain, IP, label Feodo Bots 2013-17
18 SpyEye [27] 1,412 478 Domain, IP, label SpyEye Bots 2010-14
19 Amt [2] 1,273 1,194 Domain, IP, label Malware 2015-17
20 WebIron [31] 688 676 IP, label Bots & Trojans 2016-17
21 Palevo [19] 268 119 Domain, IP, label SpyEye Bots 2011-13
22 Shodan [25] 176 157 IP, label Trojan Bots 2017-17
Total 2,272,362 297,095 2007-17
[62] Zhao, D., Traore, I., Sayed, B., Lu, W., Saad, S., Ghorbani, A., and Garant, D.
Botnet detection based on traffic behavior analysis and flow intervals. Comput.
Secur. (2013).
A BLACKLIST-07-17
This section contains supplementary material about Blacklist-07-17
(cf. Section 2.1).
A.1 Blacklist Summary
Our seed blacklists are summarized in Table 5. The majority of the
seed lists (15 out 22) provided sufficiently rich information includ-
ing timestamps of the reported mal-activities, URLs and domains
considered to be malicious, the corresponding IP address and a
free form labels of the mal-activity being reported (e.g., “PayPal
Phishing” and “Cryptowall Ransomware C&C”) describing the type
of mal-activity (phishing, exploit, botnet, etc.). Many of these lists
included additional information about the autonomous system num-
ber (ASN) and partial geolocation information (e.g., MDL [15] and
Malc0de [14]). The remaining 7 sources (e.g., 360Mirai [1]) reported
timestamps and IP addresses only.
B MAL-ACTIVITY CLASSIFICATION
In Section 2.4, we introduced six types of mal-activities, here we
provide their extended definitions.
Exploits. Exploits take advantage of vulnerabilities in software, as
either private or public knowledge, to (remotely) execute code on
the victim’s system. Exploit kits are usually used as a first stage
“dropper” to facilitate the installation of the final payload (i.e., mal-
ware).
Malware. This includes domains and IP addresses that have been
reported to distribute malicious payloads such as Trojans, viruses,
worms, and ransomware.
Fraudulent Services (FS). Domains and IP addresses engaged in the
distribution or provisioning of bogus or fraudulent services or
applications such as the promotion of comments, likes, ratings,
votes or any variations thereof [37, 39, 43].
Spammers. This class contains domains and IP addresses that are
reported to host spam-bots to perform astroturfing/grass roots
marketing [57] or to send large-scale, unsolicited emails or instant
messages.
Phishing. This is composed of domains/IPs reported to host content
aimed at obtaining sensitive information by disguising as trustwor-
thy online services.
Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP). PUP includes domains or
IP addresses involved in distributing bogus software such as free
screen-savers or fake AV scanners that surreptitiously generate
advertisements or perform redirection to collect user credentials or
personal identifiable information.
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